Soob

Pakistan has missed the ferry. Afghani Ambassador Tayeb Jawad's truism:

Afghanistan's ambassador said Wednesday that real power in Pakistan is in the hands of that nation's army and it is capable of countering extremism and terror along the countries' border.

"The real institution in charge is the military," Said Tayeb Jawad said in an interview, sidestepping an assessment of the effectiveness of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.

But Jawad said the army holds the cards. "The army is a powerful and capable institution to reduce the influence of extremism and also to fight terrorism and extremism effectively," the diplomat said.

Given the fog of loyalties concerning the Pakistani society it's hard to believe guns and money will be an effective means to end the increasingly obligatory, if scattered, Taliban (and subsequent Al Qaeda) support within it's borders. Especially those along the culturally charged slice of rugged terrain that proves a hazy divide from Afghanistan.

Musharraf's 1999 military coup realized a very focused success in that he commandeered the leadership of the nation state of Pakistan. Likely the heated relationship with India during the same time ensured his success. Fast forward eight years and three attempts on his life and our friend Pervez has yet to effectively unite his country.

His failure to win the unity of his territory is rather analogous to America's inability to "win the peace" in Iraq. In essence, through arms and political disruption Mushi won control of Pakistan and inherited a fractious, dangerous relation with neighboring India that likely bolstered his promises of non-corrupt governance.
His subsequent inability to prescribe an effective means to truly coagulate his society beyond the existing tribal/sectarian divisions (Peshawar and beyond) has led to an increasingly tenuous balancing act.

The very real possibility of increasing NATO or American operations inside Pakistan to crush the Taliban resurgence at it's source will decidedly not improve Musharraf's position.

To capture to crown is one thing. To hold the state, another.