Soob

One aspect of Francona's blog that ultimately frustrates me is his unwillingness to include reader commentary.

That bit aside, his latest post is some what parallel to my own regard in respect to Musharrafs Pakistan:

Unfortunately, the options are limited, and dictated by the internal situation in Pakistan. The gut reaction is to conduct strikes (air, missile, or special operations) and remove the camps as a threat. However, these camps are purposely built in crowded civilian areas that will result in “collateral damage,” military-speak for civilian casualties.

The resulting public outcry combined with outrage in Pakistan may cause problems for the government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf is not popular and has survived several assassination attempts. His unpopularity extends to the military and intelligence services, long accused of being allies of the fundamentalism movement, including Al-Qa'idah. There is a real possibility that he may be overthrown.

The bottom line: Anything that undermines the viability of the Musharraf government probably is too risky, as a follow-on government will likely be Islamist. As I have said before, we're just one bullet away....

Victory in Afghanistan involves destabilizing projects in Pakistan. The presence of American forces either overt or covert (which will likely be outed in the same fashion of our recent Ethiopian based operations) will effectively destabilize an already fractured nation.

A sound observation from John Robb regarding Afghanistan:

While a long fight (and potential loss) in Afghanistan would be bad, the loss of Pakistan would be worse. We are in triage at this point.

Sadly, the term "triage" applies all too well. The future of our Afghan incursion might well be determined not simply by strategy but by both strategy and the fog of political implications/future of Pakistan which are not exactly cohesive or even fully strategically understood.

What now?